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Abstract
In the paper we define a notion of quantum resistant ((ǫ, δ)-resistant) hash
function which combine together a notion of pre-image (one-way) resistance (ǫ-
resistance) property we define in the paper and the notion of collision resistance
(δ-resistance) properties.
We show that in the quantum setting a one-way resistance property and colli-
sion resistance property are correlated: the “more” a quantum function is one-way
resistant the “less” it collision resistant and vice versa. We present an explicit
quantum hash function which is “balanced” one-way resistant and collision re-
sistant and demonstrate how to build a large family quantum hash functions.
Balanced quantum hash functions need a high degree of entanglement between
the qubits. We use a “phase constructions” technique to express quantum hashing
constructions, which is good to map hash states to coherent states in a super-
position of time-bin modes. The later is ready to be implemented with current
optical technology.
1 Introduction
Quantum cryptography describes the use of quantum mechanical effects (a) to break
cryptographic systems and (b) to perform cryptographic tasks. Quantum factoring
algorithm and quantum algorithm for finding discrete logarithm are famous results
that belong for the first direction. Quantum key distribution, quantum digital signature
schemes constructions belong to the second direction of quantum cryptography.
Gottesman and Chuang proposed in 2001 a quantum digital signature protocol [1]
which is based on quantum one-way function. This is also the case for other protocols
(see for example [2]). In [3, 4] we explicitly defined a notion of quantum hashing as a
generalization of classical hashing and presented examples of quantum hash functions.
It appeared that Gottesman-Chuang quantum signature schemes are based on functions
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which are actually quantum hash functions. Those functions have “unconditionally one-
way” property based on Holevo Theorem [5]. More information on the role of quantum
hashing for the post quantum cryptography, possible application of quantum hashing for
quantum signature protocols, and technological expectations for realization of quantum
signature schemes are presented in [6].
Recall that in the classical setting a cryptographic hash function h should have
the following three properties [7]. (1) Pre-image resistance: Given h(x), it should be
difficult to find x, that is, these hash functions are one-way functions. (2) Second pre-
image resistance: Given x1, it should be difficult to find an x2, such that h(x1) = h(x2).
(3) Collision resistance: It should be difficult to find any pair of distinct x1, x2, such
that h(x1) = h(x2). Note, that there are no one-way functions that are known to be
provably more difficult to invert than to compute, the security of cryptographic hash
functions is “computationally conditional”.
Informally speaking, a quantum hash function ψ [3, 4] is a function that maps words
(over an alphabet Σ) of length k to a quantum pure states of s-qubits (ψ : Σk → (H2)⊗s)
and has the following properties:
1. Function ψ must be one-way resistant. In quantum case this means that k > s.
2. Function ψ must be collision resistant. In quantum case this means that for differ-
ent words w,w′ states |ψ(w)〉, |ψ(w′)〉must be “almost orthogonal” (δ-orthogonal)
[4].
Quantum collision resistance property cover both second pre-image resistance and col-
lision resistance properties for the quantum setting
In papers [8, 9] we considered a quantum Branching Program as a computational
model which, we believe, is adequate quantum technological model for presenting a
quantum communication protocols and quantum cryptographic signature schemes based
on hashing.
Our contribution. In the paper we define a notion of (ǫ, δ)-hash function where
values ǫ and δ are numerical characteristics of the above two properties: (i) one-way
resistance and (ii) collision resistance properties. The notion of the (ǫ, δ)-hash function
is an explicit generalization of our constructions [3, 4]. We show that in the quantum
setting the one-way resistance property and collision resistance property are correlated:
the “more” a quantum function is one-way resistant the “less” it is collision resistant
and vice versa. We present a quantum hash function which is “balanced” one-way
resistant and collision resistant. In addition we present more discussion that supports
the idea of quantum hashing from our papers. Note, that a realization of the balanced
quantum hash function requires the high degree of entanglement between the qubits
which makes such a state very difficult (or impossible) to create with current technology.
We present quantum “balanced” hashing constructions based on “phase transfor-
mation” presentation [10] instead of “amplitude transformation” [4]. The phase trans-
formation is required to map quantum hash states into a sequence of coherent states.
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Note, that quantum signature protocols using coherent states can be practically imple-
mented by now day technology that use only a sequence of coherent states, linear optics
operations, and measurements with single-photon threshold detectors. See [11, 12, 7]
for more information and citations.
2 Quantum (ǫ, δ)-Resistant Hash Function
Recall that mathematically a qubit is described as a unit vector in the two-dimensional
Hilbert complex space H2. Let s ≥ 1. Let (H2)⊗s be the 2s-dimensional Hilbert space,
describing the states of s qubits. For an integer j ∈ {0, . . . , 2s − 1} let σ = σ1 . . . σs be
a binary presentation of j. We use (as usual) notations |j〉 and |σ〉 to denote quantum
state |σ1〉 · · · |σs〉 = |σ1〉 ⊗ . . .⊗ |σs〉.
We let q to be a prime power and Fq be a finite field of order q. Let Σ
k be a set of
words of length k over a finite alphabet Σ. Let X be a finite set. In the paper we let
X = Σk, or X = Fq. For K = |X| and integer s ≥ 1 we define a (K; s) classical-quantum
function (or just quantum function) to be a unitary transformation (determined by an
element w ∈ X) of the initial state |ψ0〉 ∈ (H2)⊗s to a quantum state |ψ(w)〉 ∈ (H2)⊗s
ψ : {|ψ0〉} × X→ (H2)⊗s |ψ(w)〉 = U(w)|ψ0〉 (1)
where U(w) is a unitary matrix. We let |ψ0〉 = |0〉 in the paper and use (for short) the
following notation (instead the above)
ψ : X→ (H2)⊗s or ψ : w 7→ |ψ(w)〉
2.1 One-way Resistant Function.
We present the following definition of quantum ǫ-resistant one-way function. Let “infor-
mation extracting” mechanismM be a functionM : (H2)⊗s → X. Informally speaking
mechanism M makes some measurement to state |ψ〉 ∈ (H2)⊗s and decode the result
of measurement to X.
Definition 2.1 Let X be random variable distributed over X {Pr[X = w] : w ∈ X}.
Let ψ : X → (H2)⊗s be a quantum function. Let Y is any random variable over X
obtained by some mechanism M making measurement to the encoding ψ of X and
decoding the result of measurement to X. Let ǫ > 0. We call a quantum function ψ a
one-way ǫ-resistant function if for any mechanism M, the probability Pr[Y = X ] that
M successfully decodes Y is bounded by ǫ
Pr[Y = X ] ≤ ǫ.
For the cryptographic purposes it is natural to expect (and we do this in the rest of the
paper) that random variable X is uniformly distributed.
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A quantum state of s ≥ 1 qubits can “carry” an infinite amount of information. On
the other hand, fundamental result of quantum informatics known as Holevo’s Theorem
[5] states that a quantum measurement can only give s bits of information about the
state. We will use here the following particular version [13] of Holevo’s Theorem.
Property 2.1 (Holevo-Nayak) Let X be random variable uniformly distributed over
a k bit binary words {0, 1}k. Let ψ : {0, 1}k → (H2)⊗s be an (2k; s) quantum function.
Let Y be a random variable over X obtained by some mechanism M making some
measurement of the encoding ψ of X and decoding the result of measurement to {0, 1}k.
Then our probability of correct decoding is given by
Pr[Y = X ] ≤ 2
s
2k
.
2.2 Collision Resistant Function
The following definition was presented in [4].
Definition 2.2 Let δ > 0. We call a quantum function ψ : X → (H2)⊗s a collision
δ-resistant function if for any pair w,w′ of different elements,
|〈ψ(w) |ψ(w′)〉| ≤ δ.
Testing Equality. What one needs for quantum digital signature schemes realization
is an equality testing procedure for quantum hashes |ψ(v)〉 and |ψ(w)〉 in order to
compare classical messages v and w; see for example [1]. The SWAP-test is the known
quantum test for the equality of two unknown quantum states |ψ〉 and |ψ′〉 (see [1, 3]
for more information).
We denote Prswap[v = w] a probability that the SWAP-test having quantum hashes
|ψ(v)〉 and |ψ(w)〉 outputs the result “v = w” (outputs the result “|ψ(v)〉 = |ψ(w)〉”).
Property 2.2 ([1]) Let function ψ : w 7→ |ψ(w)〉 satisfy the following condition. For
any two different elements v, w ∈ X it is true that |〈ψ(v) |ψ(w)〉| ≤ δ. Then
Prswap[v = w] ≤ 1
2
(1 + δ2).
Proof. From the description of SWAP-test it follows that
Prswap[v = w] =
1
2
(
1 + |〈ψ(v) |ψ(w)〉|2) .

The next test for equality was first mentioned in [1]. We call this test a REVERSE-
test [3]. REVERSE-test was proposed to check if a quantum state |ψ〉 is a hash of
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an element v. Essentially the test applies the procedure that inverts the creation of a
quantum hash, i.e. it “uncomputes” the hash to the initial state.
Formally, let for element w the procedure of quantum hashing be given by uni-
tary transformation U(w), applied to initial state |φ0〉. Usually we let |φ0〉 = |0〉, i.e.
|ψ(w)〉 = U(w)|0〉. Then the REVERSE-test, given v and |ψ(w)〉, applies U−1(v) to
the state |ψ(w)〉 and measures the resulting state with respect to initial state |0〉. It
outputs v = w iff the measurement outcome is |0〉. Denote by Prreverse[v = w] the
probability that the REVERSE-test having quantum state |ψ(w)〉 and an element v
outputs the result v = w.
Property 2.3 Let hash function ψ : w 7→ |ψ(w)〉 satisfy the following condition. For
any two different elements v, w ∈ X it is true that |〈ψ(v) |ψ(w)〉| ≤ δ. Then
Prreverse[v = w] ≤ δ2.
Proof. Using the property that unitary transformation keeps scalar product we have
that
Prreverse[v = w] = |〈0 |U−1(v)ψ(w)〉|2 = |〈U−1(v)ψ(v) |U−1(v)ψ(w)〉|2 = |〈ψ(v) |ψ(w)〉|2 ≤ δ2.

2.3 One-way Resistance and Collision Resistance
The above two definitions and considerations lead to the following formalization of the
quantum cryptographic (one-way and collision resistant) function
Definition 2.3 Let K = |X| and s ≥ 1. Let ǫ > 0 and δ > 0. We call a function
ψ : X → (H2)⊗s a quantum (ǫ, δ)-Resistant (K; s)-hash function iff ψ is a one-way
ǫ-resistant and is a collision δ-resistant function.
We present below the following two examples to demonstrate how one-way ǫ-resistance
and collision δ-resistance are correlated. The first example was presented in [14] in terms
of quantum automata.
Example 2.1 Let us encode numbers v from {0, . . . , 2k−1} by a single qubit as follows:
ψ : v 7→ cos
(
2πv
2k
)
|0〉+ sin
(
2πv
2k
)
|1〉.
Extracting information from |ψ〉 by measuring |ψ〉 with respect to the basis {|0〉, |1〉}
gives the following result. The function ψ is one-way 1
2k
-resistant (see Property 2.1) and
collision cos
(
π/2k−1
)
-resistant. According to the properties 2.1 and 2.3 the function ψ
has good one-way property, but has bad resistance property for a large k.
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Example 2.2 We consider a number v ∈ {0, . . . , 2k − 1} to be also a binary word
v ∈ {0, 1}k. Let v = σ1 . . . σk. We encode v by k qubits: ψ : v 7→ |v〉 = |σ1〉 · · · |σk〉.
Extracting information from |ψ〉 by measuring |ψ〉 with respect to the basis {|0 . . . 0〉, . . . , |1 . . . 1〉}
gives the following result. The function ψ is one-way 1-resistant and collision 0-resistant.
So, in contrary to the Example 2.1 the encoding ψ from the Example 2.2 is collision
free, that is, for different words v and w quantum states |ψ(v)〉 and |ψ(v)〉 are orthogo-
nal and therefore reliably distinguished; but we loose the one-way property: ψ is easily
invertible.
The following result [4] shows that quantum collision δ-resistant (K; s) function
needs at least log logK − c(δ) qubits.
Property 2.4 ([4]) Let s ≥ 1 and K = |X| ≥ 4. Let ψ : X → (H2)⊗s be a δ-resistant
(K; s) hash function. Then
s ≥ log logK − log log
(
1 +
√
2/(1− δ)
)
− 1.
Properties 2.4 and 2.1 provide a basis for building a “balanced” one-way ǫ-resistance
and collision δ-resistance properties. That is, roughly speaking, if we need to hash
elements w from a domain X with |X| = K and if one can build for a δ > 0 a collision
δ-resistant (K; s) hash function ψ with s ≈ log logK − c(δ) qubits then the function f
will be a one-way ǫ-resistant with ǫ ≈ (logK/K).
3 “Balanced” Quantum Hash Functions Construc-
tions
We start by recalling some definitions, notations, and facts from [15]. For a field Fq,
the discrete Fourier transform of a set B ⊆ Fq is the function
fB(w) =
∑
b∈B
exp
[
i
2πwb
q
]
defined for every w ∈ Fq. let λ(B) = maxw 6=0 |fB(w)|/|B|. For δ > 0 we define B ⊆ Fq
to be δ-good if λ(B) ≤ δ. By Bδ,q we denote δ-good subset of Fq. For a field Fq, let
B ⊆ Fq. For every b ∈ B and w ∈ Fq, define a function hb : Fq → Fq and a family HB
by the rule
hb(w) = bw (mod q), HB = {hb : b ∈ B}.
We denote by Hδ,q the above set of functions and call Hδ,q δ-good if B = Bδ,q is δ-good.
Theorem 3.1 Let δ > 0 and q be a prime power. Let Hδ,q = {h1, . . . , hT} be δ-good.
Then for s = log T a function
∣∣ψHδ,q (w)〉 = 1√
T
T∑
j=1
exp
[
i
2πhj(w)
q
]
|j〉. (2)
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is a collision δ-resistant (q; s) quantum hash function.
Proof. Note, that the proof of this theorem in terms of amplitude transformation was
presented in [3]. The proof presented below is in terms of phase transformation [10].
Let Bδ,q = {b1, . . . , bT } determines δ-good family Hδ,q. We let H = Hδ,q in the proof.
We consider the following quantum function ψH : Fq → (H2)⊗s of function ψH
|ψH(w)〉 = 1√
T
T∑
j=1
exp
[
i
2πhj(w)
q
]
|j〉 = 1√
T
T∑
j=1
exp
[
i
2πwbj
q
]
|j〉.
The quantum state |ψH(w)〉 composed from s qubits. To show that ψH is collision
δ-resistant (q; s) quantum hash function we prove the collision δ-resistance of ψH . Con-
sider a pair w,w′ of different elements from Fq and their inner product 〈ψH(w) |ψH(w′)〉.
Recall that the inner product of two complex vectors |α〉 = (α1, . . . , αT ) and |β〉 =
(β1, . . . , βT ) is the sum 〈α |β〉 =
∑
j αj β¯j where β¯j is the complex conjugate of βj. Us-
ing the fact that the conjugate of eiφ is e−iφ, and the fact that Bδ,q is δ-good we have
that
〈ψH(w) |ψH(w′)〉 = 1
T
∑
b∈Bδ,q
exp
[
i
2π(w − w′)b
q
]
≤ λ(Bδ,q) ≤ δ.

• In [4] we defined a set of discrete functions a quantum hash generator if it allow
to built a quantum hash function.
In the context of Theorem 3.1 the set Hδ,q is a collision δ-resistant hash generator: it
generates the quantum hash function ψHδ,q .
Optimality of the hashing scheme. The following facts were presented in [15]. Let
δ = δ(q) be any function tending to zero as q grows to infinity. Then there exists δ-good
set Bδ,q with |Bδ,q| = (log q/δ(q))O(1). Several optimal (in the sense of the above lower
bound) explicit constructions of δ-good sets Bδ,q were presented by different authors.
For those constructions
δ(q) =
1
(log q)O(1)
and |Bδ,q| = (log q)O(1).
The following statement summarize Theorem 3.1 and the above consideration.
Corollary 3.1 Let q be a prime power, T (q) = (log q)O(1), and s = log T (q). Let ǫ(q) =
T (q)/q and δ(q) = 1/T (q). Let Hδ,q be δ(q)-good set of functions with |Hδ,q| = T (q).
Then
1. ψHδ,q is “balanced” quantum (ǫ(q), δ(q))-resistant quantum (T (q); s)-hash function.
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2. The number s of qubits is good in the sense of the lower bound of Property 2.4
which gives the following lower bound s ≥ log log q − log log
(
1 +
√
2/δ
)
− 1.
We refer to the paper [3] for more information on practical construction of the set
Hδ,q and the Numerical results from genetic algorithm for Hδ,q construction.
Balanced Quantum Hash Function Families. In [4] we offered design, which
allows to build a large amount of different quantum hash functions. The construction
is based on composition of classical ǫ-universal hash family [16] and a given family
Hδ,q a quantum hash generator. A resulting family of functions is a new quantum
hash generator. In particular, we present a quantum hash generator GRS based on
Reed-Solomon code.
Let q be a prime power, let k ≤ n ≤ q, let Fq be a finite field. A Reed-Solomon code
(for short RS-code) is a linear code CRS : (Fq)
k → (Fq)n defined as follows. Each word
w ∈ (Fq)k, w = w0w1 . . . wk−1 associated with the polynomial Pw(x) =
∑k−1
i=0 wix
i. Pick
n distinct elements (evaluation points) A = {a1, . . . , an} of Fq. A common special case
is n = q− 1 with the set of evaluating points being A = Fq\{0}. To encode word w we
evaluate Pw(x) on over all n elements a ∈ A CRS(w) = (Pw(a1) . . . Pw(an)).
We define family FRS = {fa : a ∈ A} based on RS-code CRS as follows. For a ∈ A
define fa : (Fq)
k → Fq by the rule fa(w) = Pw(a). Let Hδ,q = {h1, . . . , hT} be a δ-good
set of functions, satisfying Corollary 3.1. Composition
GRS = FRS ◦Hδ,q = {gjl : g = hj(fal), hj ∈ Hδ,q, fal ∈ FRS}
is a quantum hash generator. Let s = log n + log T . GRS generates function ψGRS :
(Fq)
k → (H2)⊗s for a word w ∈ (Fq)k by the rule
|ψGRS (w)〉 =
1√
nT
n,T∑
l=1,j=1
exp
[
i
2πgjl(w))
q
]
|lj〉 (3)
here |lj〉 denotes a basis quantum state, where lj is treated as a concatenation of the
binary representations of l and j.
Property 3.1 Let q be a prime power and let 2 ≤ k < n ≤ q. Then for arbitrary
δ ∈ (0, 1) the function ψGRS is an (ǫ,∆)-resistant (qk; s) quantum hash function, where
ǫ ≤ (q log q)/qk, ∆ ≤ k−1
n
+ δ, and s ≤ log (q log q) + 2 log 1/δ + 4.
Let c > 1. If we select n = ck, then ∆ < 1/c + δ and according to Theorem 2.4 there
exist constants c1(∆), c2(∆) such that log (q log q)− c1(∆) ≤ s ≤ log (q log q) + c2(∆).
Thus, Reed Solomon codes provide balanced parameters for resistance values ǫ, ∆ and
for a number s of qubits for hash function ψRS.
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4 Presenting Quantum Hash States via Coherent
States
Written in the form given in (2) and (3), the hash states
∣∣ψHδ,q(w)〉 ∈ (H2)⊗s, w ∈
Fq, and |ψRS(w)〉 ∈ (H2)⊗s, w ∈ (Fq)k, need high degree of entanglement between s
qubits which is hard for the current technology. Papers [11, 12, 7] consider the idea of
presenting quantum fingerprinting states via coherent states and developed signature
constructions based on such coherent states.
Following idea from [11, 12], we map the hash state
∣∣ψHδ,q (w)〉 ∈ (H2)⊗s for w ∈ Fq
to a coherent state as follows. For short we let Hδ,q = H in the rest of the section. Let
T = 2s. First, we define hash mode (H-hash mode) aH,w as
aH,w =
1√
T
T∑
j=1
exp
[
i
2πhj(w)
q
]
bj ,
where bj ∈ {b1, . . . , bT} is the annihilation operator of the jth optical mode. Hash state
is a single-photon state in the hash mode: |ψH(w)〉 = aH,w|0〉.
Next, we define coherent hash state as |α, ψH(w)〉 = DH,w(α)|0〉, with parameter α,
where DH,w(α) = exp
[
αa†H,w − α∗aH,w
]
is the displacement operator. According to [12]
we have that the state |ψH(w)〉 is mapped to |α, ψH(w)〉:
|ψH(w)〉 → |α, ψH(w)〉 =
T⊗
j=1
∣∣∣∣exp
[
i
2πhj(w)
q
]
α√
T
〉
j
,
where
∣∣∣exp[i2pihj(w)q
]
α√
T
〉
j
is a coherent state with amplitude α√
T
in the jth mode.
Similarly one can map the hash state |ψRS(w)〉 ∈ (H2)⊗s with w ∈ (Fq)k to a
coherent state.
In the next paper we will present a variants of quantum signature schemes based on
quantum hash functions different from quantum fingerprinting function.
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